Institutions and economic performance: a review of the theory and evidence by Ugur, Mehmet
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Institutions and economic performance:
a review of the theory and evidence
Mehmet Ugur
University of Greenwich
September 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25909/
MPRA Paper No. 25909, posted 18. October 2010 14:49 UTC
1 
 
 
 
 
Institutions and economic performance: 
A review of the theory and evidence 
 
Mehmet Ugur 
Reader in Political Economy, University of Greenwich Business School, Department of International 
Business and Economics, .Ugur@gre.ac.uk  
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this article is to take stock of the theoretical debate and empirical findings concerning 
the impact of institutions on economic performance and the channels through which the 
institutional impact unfolds. The review is limited to work published until 2004 due to space 
limitations and the exponential increase in the literature after 2004 – a development that justifies 
a separate review in itself. We trace the evolution of the institutional approach, identify the 
channels through which institutional quality might affect economic performance, report the 
empirical findings, and assess the institutional approach’s contribution to economic analysis and 
policy design. Our findings suggest that the institutional approach has made both theoretical and 
empirical contributions to economics research and has inspired policy debate, but the debate is 
lopsided with its focus on developing countries only.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Institutions form the incentive structure of a society, and the political 
and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying 
determinants of economic performance’ (North, 1994: 359). 
 
In the 1990s, an extensive literature has emerged on the relationship between institutional quality 
and economic performance.1
                                                 
1 Although interest in the impact of institutions on economic performance dates back to Adam Smith, the rise of 
institutional analysis we refer to is a phenomenon of the 1990s. Institutional analysis draws on the work of 
Williamson (1985) and North (1990). Williamson is in the tradition of Coase (1937) and focuses on institutions as 
‘governing structures’. North, however, tends to focus on institutions as determinants of the society’s incentive 
structures in general and economic performance in particular. The Transition Reports of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Report of 2002 are examples of how the institutional 
approach has influenced the policy outlook of international organisations.  
 The proliferation of the literature was underpinned by two stylised 
facts. One has been the evident association between the institutional vacuum and the dramatic 
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worsening of economic performance that followed the collapse of the ex-socialist regimes. As 
Coase (1992: 714) has indicated in his Nobel Prize lecture, the transition experience of the ex-
Soviet regimes demonstrated that the inclusion of ‘…institutional factors in the corpus of 
mainstream economics’ could not be avoided any longer.  
 
The other concerns the evident persistence, and even worsening, of the inequality between the 
least-developed and developed countries. According to the World Bank’s World Development 
Report (2006: 9-15), inter-country inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has been 
increasing since 1980. This trend has also been confirmed by Atkinson and Brandolini (2004), 
who found that both absolute and intermediate indices of inequality have been pointing to 
increased levels of cross-country inequality. Given the diffusion of technology and increased 
capital mobility that globalisation was expected to deliver, it proved difficult to explain the 
worsening international inequality by referring to capital accumulation or technology – both of 
which are significant determinants of growth in the neo-classical approach to economic 
development. That is why the World Bank (2002:2) had to acknowledge that the main challenge 
for development policy at the turn of the twenty-first century was the supply of effective market-
supporting institutions, and the creation of demand for such institutions. 
 
To review the institutional literature in economics, the article is organised in three sections. In 
Section 2, we examine the different definitions of institutions and their implications for 
incorporating institutions into economic analysis. Section 3, on the other hand, provides an 
account of how the institutional approach has remained marginalised in standard economic 
analysis despite the fact that economists’ interest in institutions dates back to Adam Smith, and a 
large number of attempts had been made to incorporate institutions into economic analysis and 
model building. In section 4, we take stock of the empirical work on the relationship between 
institutional quality and economic performance. In this section, we examine the developments in 
model building and methodology and comment on the robustness or the empirical findings. 
Finally, we conclude by summarising the main contributions of the institutional approach to our 
understanding of economic development and point out the potential achievements and 
challenges that lie ahead.  
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2. Institutions and economic performance: definitional issues 
 
According to North (1994: 360), institutions are ‘humanly devised constraints (e.g., rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g. norms of behaviour, conventions, voluntary codes of 
conduct) and their enforcement characteristics.’ The main function/role fulfilled by institutions is 
that they define ‘the incentive structure’ of societies and economies. Lin and Nugent (1995: 
2306-2307), among others, concur with this view by defining institutions as ‘a set of … 
behavioural rules that shape and govern interactions between human beings, partly by helping 
them to form expectations …’. In this approach, institutions differ from organisations as the 
former determine the environment within which organisations emerge, develop and function.  
 
The distinction between institutions and organizations is necessary for two reasons. First, 
organisations such as firms, central banks, or regulatory agencies are essentially goal-oriented 
economic actors. Organisations may well be guided and constrained by institutional constraints, 
or they may well be the executors of the institutional norms. However, organisations are still 
different than institutions because the latter may emerge as solutions to collective action 
problems and/or frame the choices of economic actors, but they cannot be reduced to actions 
taken by organisations or organisational rules governing the functioning of organisations.  
Secondly, the distinction between institutions and organisations enables us to focus on the 
‘governance quality’ rather than organisational structures per se. In this context, governance 
quality refers to the extent to which public- or private-sector organisations are subject to the 
right mix of incentives and constraints that delivers optimal outcomes. Therefore, institutions as 
governance quality are more pervasive in their effects not only on the economy as a whole, but 
also on the organisations within the economic sphere.  
 
Nelson and Sampat (2001) identify three different uses of institutions as a variable that affect 
economic performance. First, there is the ‘rule of the game’ approach associated with North 
(1990, 1994). In fact, this approach is implicit in Coase (1960) and focuses on the impact of 
institutions on transactions between economic actors. In this approach, institutions are well-
understood rules of the game that may or may not ensure a certain degree of predictability to 
individual or corporate behaviour. To the extent that institutions are conducive to predictability, 
they encourage contracting between economic actors.  
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The positive impact of institutions on contracting comes from two sources: (i) increased 
probability of contracting due to the predictability of the parties’ likely actions; and (ii) increased 
probability of compliance due to the existence of well-defined sanction rules. According to 
Wallis and North (1986), transaction costs are significant and tend to increase as the level of 
development increases. They found that 45 percent of the US GNP in the 1970s was absorbed by 
what they call the ‘transactions sector’. Given this high level of transaction costs, institutions 
emerge as a significant factor that affects economic performance through two channels: (a) 
lower costs per transaction, which implies an efficiency gain; and (b) higher volume of 
transactions so that a larger number of mutually-beneficial economic activities are undertaken. 
The combination of both is conducive to better economic performance in the long run. 
 
The second approach to institutions is associated with Williamson (1975, 1985), but again it was 
first put forward by Coase (1937). In this approach, institutions are considered as ‘governance 
structures’ rather than as ‘rules of the game’. The emphasis here is on ownership structures, 
hierarchies, corporate culture, or agency problems. The question addressed by this approach is 
the following: how do institutions enable economic actors to avoid prisoners’ dilemma outcomes 
or prevent the collective action failures in their repeated interactions? One way in which 
institutions can help resolving such problems is the guarantee they provide for well-defined 
property rights (Coase, 1937). Another way would be statutory or voluntary governance 
standards that could alleviate agency problems, where the agents (public or private actors) act 
against the interests of the principals (citizens, consumers, stakeholders, etc.) who appoint them 
to carry out a certain task. The difference between this approach and the previous approach may 
not be evident, but it can be clarified as follows: ‘institutions as governing structures’ are a 
system of rules that enable economic actors to avoid agency problems or prisoners’ dilemma 
situations that would emerge when ‘institutions as rules of the game’ are either ineffective or 
absent. 
 
The third approach to institutions is associated with Axelrod (1984). In his comprehensive 
analysis of co-operation, Axelrod explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-
interested actors (superpowers, businesses, or individuals) when there is no central authority to 
police their actions. He points out the importance of internalised norms that encourage co-
operative behaviour within large groups that, according to Olson (1971 and 1982), face 
collective action problems preventing them from cooperation. In this setting, institutions can 
resolve information and sanctioning problems in a decentralized manner (Dixit, 2008). In this 
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setting, institutions are rather informal and they emerge as a result of repeated actions that signal 
information about potential trading partners or punish the partners when the latter cheat.  
 
The paragraphs above illustrate not only the potential contribution of institutions to long-run 
economic performance, but also the difficulty of settling on a commonly-agreed definition of 
institutions. To address this difficulty, we propose to proceed along two tracks. First, we will 
examine the theoretical/analytical propositions put forward on how institutions affect economic 
performance. This exercise will enable us to understand why institutions are relevant to the study 
of economic performance, discover which institutions are thought to be relevant; and propose a 
typology of institutions and their effects on the functioning of a market economy. Secondly, we 
will examine the empirical literature with a view to establish the findings concerning the impact 
of institutions on economic performance. This exercise will enable us to see how institutional 
quality is measured, assess the reliability of the empirical findings, and ascertain the extent to 
which the institutional quality measures used in empirical studies can be accommodated within 
the proposed institutional typology.  
 
3.  Institutions and economic performance: the theory  
 
Interest in the impact of institutions on economic development has a long history. Early 
references to the importance of institutions date back to Adam Smith. In his Wealth of Nations, 
Smith (1976: 910) postulates that ‘Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish in any state 
… in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.’ In other 
words, ‘rule of law’ is a major institutional factor that encourages trade and industry. In another 
section of the book, Smith (1976: 284-85) is more explicit: he relates the differences in 
investment rates (hence, the differences in growth rates) to the extent to which the ‘rule of law’ 
and property rights exist: 
 
‘In all countries where there is tolerable security, every man of common understanding will endeavour to 
employ whatever stock he can command in procuring either present enjoyment or future profit. …In those 
unfortunate countries … where men are continually afraid of the violence of their superiors, they 
frequently bury and conceal a great part of their stock.’  
 
What is significant here is that the level of security or the risk of expropriation emerges as 
significant determinants of the extent to which private economic agents save and invest. The 
higher the level of security and the lower the risk of expropriation are, the higher is the level of 
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investment and, therefore, the higher is the level of economic growth. According to Smith (1976: 
405), institutional factors can explain not only the cross-country differences in growth rates, but 
also regional disparities within a country:   
 
‘Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of individuals, were … 
established in cities at a time when the occupiers of land in the country were exposed to every sort of 
violence. … [therefore] industry, which aims at something more than necessary subsistence, was 
established in cities long before it was commonly practised by the occupiers of land in the country.’  
 
Neo-classical economics has ignored these early insights for a long time as it strived to explain 
economic growth by reference to a technical production function that includes two factors of 
production (capital and labour) and utility functions that depict the levels of utility associated 
with different input choices. Once the wider institutional context is assumed away in this 
manner, it was relatively straightforward to demonstrate that resource allocation would be 
Pareto-optimal if there was perfect competition. In addition, any Pareto-optimal resource 
allocation that is technically feasible can be achieved by establishing free markets. The problem 
with this institution-free view of the world has always been that it cannot explain why different 
non-market institutions coexist with markets, how market and non-market institutions interact, 
and whether different rates of growth performance may be related to differences in institutional 
characteristics of national economies.  
 
Another, but potentially more significant, problem with the neo-classical view is that the 
reduction of economic activity to a technical production function is not compatible with their 
‘background’ assumptions concerning the existence of property rights and conclusion of 
contracts with a degree of confidence (Rodrik, 2000). If the existing definition of property rights 
is not credible due to the existence of a highly intrusive or excessively weak state, or if contract 
enforceability is low due to low judicial quality, the technically-feasible outcomes may remain 
socially-unfeasible.  
 
Moreover, the technical view of economic development is not compatible with the persistence of 
the development gap between the least-developed and developed countries. Given that scarcity 
leads to higher rates of return on capital in the least-developed countries, the latter should have 
been able to attract capital, increase output and catch up with their developed counterparts. True, 
policy failures or perverse policies may inhibit the flow of foreign capital and the accumulation 
of domestic capital, leading to slower growth. Such policy failures, however, beg the following 
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question: why should such sub-optimal policies persist in under-developed countries? In other 
words, why are less developed countries caught in a ‘vicious circle’ of ‘wrong’ policies and low 
growth whereas developed countries enjoy a ‘virtuous circle’ of ‘right’ policies and high growth 
rates?  
 
The neo-classical approach has difficulty explaining the privatisation and liberalisation 
experience of the transition economies too. The transition experience has demonstrated that the 
creation of markets and private property rights were not sufficient for the emergence of efficient 
entrepreneurs. Instead, it has led to the emergence of entrepreneurs excelling in anti-competitive 
behaviour, tax avoidance, and corporate governance failures that range from outright fraud to 
insider dealing. As Coase (1992: 714) has indicated, the countries of the ex-Soviet space ‘may 
be advised to move to a market economy, …, but without the appropriate institutions no market 
economy is possible.’ The appropriate institutions in this context include, but are not limited to, 
rule of law and property rights. They also include regulatory institutions, institutions of social 
insurance, institutions of conflict resolution, and institutions supportive of the production of 
‘public goods’ in the general sense, including an efficient public policy.  
 
After a long silence on the role of institutions in economic development, some economists and 
economic historians re-examined the issue in the 1950s and 1960s. This was evident in Myrdal’s 
work on regional disparities within countries and persistent poverty in Asia. Whilst Myrdal 
(1957) drew attention to how some initial conditions related to the physical and social 
infrastructure can exacerbate regional disparities within a country, Myrdal (1968) highlights the 
institutional determinants of Asia’s underdevelopment in an international context. However, the 
general preoccupation with mathematically tractable hypotheses was such that works guided by 
an institutional perspective remained largely excluded from mainstream publication outlets.  
 
One exception we could identify was an article published in American Economic Review in mid-
1950s. In that article, Charles Wolf, Jr. (1955: 867), argued that the absence of the ‘right 
institutions’ might be a more significant determinant of low capital formation compared to the 
shortage of savings. What is meant by ‘right institutions’ is that kind of institutions ‘… which 
permit or stimulate, rather than impede, the adoption of new techniques and the formation of 
productive capital.’ In addition, ‘Growth-promoting institutions … may so restructure the 
environment in which factors of production meet that the rate at which combinations occur is 
accelerated.’ In other words, institutions may contribute to economic growth not only by 
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encouraging the adoption of new technologies, but also by accelerating the rate at which capital 
is combined with labour – i.e., by increasing the rate of investment.  
 
In terms of causation, Wolf, Jr (1955: 869) suggests that institutions stimulate or impede 
economic growth rather than the other way round. Specifically, institutions affect economic 
growth through their effects on: (i) the economic agents’ calculation of costs and benefits; (ii) 
the predictability and probability of economic relationships; (iii) knowledge of economic 
opportunities; and (iv) motivations and values. This specification is in line with the ‘institutions 
as rules of the game’ approach, which focuses on how institutions shape the incentive structure 
faced by economic actors. 
 
The institution-aversion observed in the mainstream economics journals, however, must be 
contrasted with the dramatic explosion of the ‘dependency’ literature from the second half of the 
1960s onwards. The dependency literature presented a radical challenge to mainstream 
economics because of its explicit focus on the wider context of economic development, 
including the colonial history and political structures of under-developed countries, and the 
unequal distribution of power between the former and the developed countries.2 We cannot 
provide a comprehensive assessment of this literature’s contribution to the study economic 
development in general.3
 
 We would merely observe that the dependency literature did not lead 
to the building of bridges between the ‘institutional insights’ of the classical economists and the 
institutional literature that would emerge in the 1990s. This was for three reasons.  
First, the dependency (or dependent development) literature considers the market to be a cause 
of the under-development problem rather than a solution to it. Therefore, it had no or little 
interest in the emergence and development of market-supporting endogenous institutions. This 
market-aversion was justified by the premise that dependency relations between developing and 
developed capitalist countries can permit the emergence of only distorted markets. The latter 
would serve mainly the interest of the international capital or those of its local collaborators.  
 
Secondly, one stream of the dependency literature was concerned with the distribution of 
‘power’ between developed and under-developed countries and not with institutional quality 
differences between the two. As a result, it focused on mechanisms of unequal exchange and 
                                                 
2 For political economy studies of dependent development, see Frank (1969, 1978). On unequal exchange and 
systemic factors, see Emmanuel (1972) and  Wallerstein (1979).  
3 For reviews of the dependent development literature, see Evans and Fernandes (1979) and Roxborough (1979). 
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exploitation, externally-induced economic and political distortions, etc. as the determinants of 
divergent development paths. Although those external factors may affect the quality of 
endogenous institutions, they do not translate into reliable measures of the latter. Finally, the 
other stream of the dependency literature was concerned with structural characteristics of the 
under-developed economies. These included pre-existing patterns of specialisation, the class 
structure that emerged in the context of that specialisation, and the colonial legacy, etc. Again, 
these factors may affect institutional quality but they cannot be translated into measures of the 
latter.  
 
As a result, the absence of an institutional perspective continued to characterise the mainstream 
economics until mid-1980s, when Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) came up 
with two pioneering papers that explored the effect of institutions on cross-country growth and 
investment. By the 1990s, the transition experience and the persistence of cross-country income 
inequalities - coupled with the capital mobility and technological diffusion that globalisation was 
expected to bring about - made it difficult to overlook the institutional determinants of economic 
performance. As Rodrik (2000) has indicated, the liberalisation reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrated that economic actors in both developed and developing countries were sensitive to 
price signals, but only to the extent that these signals were perceived to be predictable and 
credible. In addition, the incentives (or opportunities) revealed by price signals would be 
conducive to increased national welfare only if there were institutions ensuring predictable 
property rights, curbing the worst forms of corruption and corporate abuse, ameliorating moral 
hazard problems, mitigating risks, and managing social or political conflicts.  
 
The contribution of the institutional perspective to the economics of development is summarised 
very well in Aron (2000) and Rodrik (2000), who identify the range of relevant institutions and 
elaborate on how they impact on economic performance. Drawing on Rodrik, we can classify 
institutions into four categories. The categories and their effects on economic 
development/performance can be summarised as follows:  
 
(a) Property rights institutions. These are norms and rules that confer and guarantee control on 
the returns to the assets invested or values produced. The institutions in this category refer to the 
rule of law, law enforcement quality, contract enforceability, risk of appropriation, political 
discretion, accountability, and procedures for change of executive. Property rights institutions 
affect economic performance by affecting the economic actors’ decisions to save and invest in 
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physical as well as human capital, and all decisions related to the conclusion of mutually-
beneficial contracts. They also affect economic performance by establishing a certain level of 
trust, which reduces the risks associated with given levels of returns on investment and 
contracting. 
 
(b) Regulatory institutions. The institutions in this category correspond to norms, rules and 
regulations that can prevent or mitigate market failures and agency problems. They indicate the 
extent to which the civil service is independent from politicians, the extent to which policy 
makers and regulators are open to capture by interest groups, and economic policy-makers as 
well as corporate actors are accountable to the public in general and stakeholders in particular. 
They can be measured by the extent of corruption, tax evasion, regulatory burden, quality of 
bureaucracy, etc. These norms and regulations affect economic performance by enhancing the 
efficiency of public policy and by mitigating the risk of anti-competitive behaviour, free-riding, 
and rent-seeking by corporate actors. 
 
(c) Institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation.  These are institutions that could reduce 
macroeconomic instability either by minimising the incidence of policy-induced macroeconomic 
volatility or by increasing the resilience of the economy to adverse external shocks. The strength 
of the stabilisation institutions can be measured by the independence of the central bank, by the 
transparency and credibility of the budgetary process, and by the extent to which competences 
are distributed and accountability is ensured by transparent rules and procedures. Stabilisation 
institutions can affect economic performance by reducing uncertainty and making economic 
growth sustainable.  
 
(d) Institutions for conflict resolution. These are the norms, rules and principles that are in 
place to resolve social/economic and political/ethnic conflicts. The economic/social conflict 
resolution institutions address co-ordination failures, distribution problems, and issues of 
inclusion/exclusion into the formal economy. The ethnic/political conflict resolution institutions 
address issues such as violence, law and order, personal security, etc. While economic/social 
conflict resolution institutions affect economic performance by reducing the risk of prisoners’ 
dilemma situations and associated sub-optimal outcomes, ethnic/political conflict resolution 
institutions affect economic performance by enhancing internal security. 
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This summary enables us to propose that institutions have two aggregate effects on economic 
performance: a market-creating effect and a market-deepening effect. The market-creating effect 
captures the extent to which existing institutions encourage/support the emergence and growth of 
markets where economic actors can engage in mutually beneficial economic activities. The 
higher the institutional quality is, the lower are the transaction costs, the higher are the 
transaction volumes, and the higher is the probability that economic actors will extend their 
activities into new areas or sectors.  The overall result is an expansion in the set of mutually-
beneficial economic activities and an increase in economic performance. This result is 
underpinned by institutional quality that encourages trust/cooperation, higher levels of 
contracting, and provides incentives for investment in human as well as physical capital.  
 
The market-deepening effect, on the other hand, refers to increased efficiency of the existing 
markets in which economic actors interact and conclude mutually-beneficial contracts. This 
effect is felt as a result of improved public and private governance quality, which enables 
economic actors to secure higher overall returns on a given volume of contracting. In other 
words, quality institutions lead to higher levels of governance quality that is conducive to: (i) 
reduced risks of coordination failures and agency problems; (ii) lower incidence of externalities 
and market failures; and (iii) improved policy credibility and reduced macroeconomic volatility. 
As the quality of governance-supporting institutions increases, economies will be less likely to 
suffer welfare losses that arise from resource misallocation and distortions.  
 
This ‘effect classification’ has an added heuristic value because it can also enable us to address 
the problem posed by the lack of agreement on an operational definition of institutions. As 
indicated above, there are at least three competing definitions and the recent empirical research 
has not addressed this problem. True, the empirical research (which will be reviewed below) has 
strengthened the institutional approach significantly by using and refining quantitative measures 
of institutional quality. This contribution, however, should not detract attention from the fact that 
contributors to the empirical literature have eschewed the definitional problem mainly because 
overlooking it provided a degree of freedom for choosing certain institutional indicators and not 
others. We think that it is possible to reduce the risk of ad hoc selection if we can demonstrate 
that the ‘market-creating’ and ‘market-deepening’ effects of institutions can be associated with 
two types of institutions that more or less exhaust the range of institutional indicators used in 
empirical research. 
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Our reading of the literature suggests that it is possible to associate the two effects of the 
institutions with two institutional types. Type I corresponds to institutions covered by the ‘rules 
of the game’ and the ‘cooperation-supporting institutions’ definitions introduced above. Type I 
institutions include the ‘institutions of property rights’ and ‘conflict resolution institutions’ 
suggested by Rodrik (2000). The quality of Type I institutions can be measured by the quality of 
the following indicators: rule of law, contract enforceability, risk of expropriation, power and 
accountability, judicial competence and impartiality, and trust. Type II institutions, on the other 
hand, correspond to ‘institutions as governance structures’ definition and include the remaining 
2 categories suggested by Rodrik (2000): regulatory institutions and stabilisation institutions. 
The quality of Type II institutions can be measured by the quality of the following indicators: 
bureaucratic/government efficiency, policy predictability, company law and corporate 
governance regimes, and transparency/accountability. 
 
To be able to visualise the impact of institutional quality on cross-country differences in 
economic performance over time, we propose a diagrammatical model depicted in Figure 1 
below. Our model is based on standard assumptions in economics – namely that economic actors 
are rational and try to maximise utility under certain constraints. The information available to 
economic actors may not be perfect, but the actors will take account of the existing information 
and respond to new information that becomes available. In the model, the quality of institutions 
and institutional change are considered as information signals to which the utility-maximising 
economic actors respond in a rational way.  
 
We conceptualise the impact of Type I institutions on economic performance as a ‘market-
creating effect’. In other words, Type I institutions encourage better economic performance by 
creating new incentives for contracting between economic actors who seek to exploit mutually-
beneficial economic opportunities.  The market-creating effect can be traced over three stages. In 
stage 1, Type I institutions delineate the society’s incentive and sanction framework. In other 
words, they provide information about the range of actions that are encouraged or discouraged, 
and the likely rewards or costs associated with such actions. In stage 2, the information about 
incentives and sanctions delineates the level of contract intensity, the level of trust, the incidence 
of economic/political conflict, and the level of incentives for investment in physical and human 
capital. Finally, in stage 3, contract and investment intensity affects economic performance, 
which can be measured as GDP growth rates and/or GDP per capita levels.  
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Figure 1: Institutions and economic performance: a diagrammatical model 
 
The effect of Type II institutions, on the other hand, is conceptualised as a ‘market-deepening 
effect’. Put differently, better Type II institutions enable economic actors to secure higher 
returns on their economic activities – either because of the predictability of the governance 
Quality of 
institutions 
Institutions as 
‘rules of the 
game’ 
Institutions as 
‘governance 
quality’ 
 Public policy and 
corporate behaviour 
Impact on Impact on 
Type I 
Institutions 
Type II 
Institutions 
• Trust / cooperation 
• Contract intensity 
• Capital investment  
• Investment in human 
capital 
• Coordination 
• Regulation 
• Stability 
• Conflict resolution 
Incentive / sanction 
structures 
 Impact on  Impact on 
Economic performance 
Market-creating 
effect on 
Market-deepening 
effect on 
Feedback effect 
Feedback effect 
14 
 
frameworks or because of the limits they impose on collectively sub-optimal courses of action. 
Again, the market deepening effect can be examined in three stages. In stage 1, governance 
quality affects the quality of public policy, including its regulatory and stabilisation dimensions. 
In stage 2, public and private governance quality affects the quality of the regulatory frameworks 
and corporate governance regimes within which economic actors interact with each other. While 
the quality of the public policy reduces policy-induced uncertainties and risks, the quality of the 
regulatory frameworks reduces the risks associated with agency problems, coordination failures, 
and rent-seeking. Finally, in stage 3, the quality of regulation, coordination, and governance 
affects economic performance.  
 
Although the distinction between ‘market-creating’ and ‘market-deepening’ effects is a useful 
analytical construct, we must indicate that the two effects are not mutually exclusive. In other 
words, we can expect to have both market creation and market enhancement effects within each 
of the channels in the model above. However, we should also indicate that Type I institutions 
(the left-hand channel) tend to generate predominantly market-creating effects whereas Type II 
institutions (the right-hand channel) tend to generate predominantly market-deepening effects. 
This is because Type I institutions tend to delineate the incentive structure faced by economic 
actors, whereas Type II institutions tend to determine the efficiency with which the contracts for 
employment, supply or credit are implemented. Yet, this distinction becomes less relevant when 
aggregate measures of institutional quality are used for estimation purposes. 
 
The third point to be made about the proposed model is that economic performance has feedback 
effects on institutional quality. As we shall see in the discussion of empirical findings, the 
feedback effect can occur for two reasons. On the one hand, higher levels of economic 
development enable societies to afford the development and implementation costs associated 
with new institutions. To the extent that this is the case, economic performance would have a 
direct feedback effect on institutional quality. On the other hand, economic performance is likely 
to have an indirect (or perception) effect on institutional quality because of the way in which 
institutional quality data is collected. Institutional quality data is usually collected via surveys of 
economic actors, whose perceptions of existing institutions are likely to be influenced by how 
well the economy is performing at a given time. The proposed model suggests that we should 
isolate the direct and indirect feedback effects when we examine the impact of institutions on 
economic performance over time. As observed in the cross-country empirical studies, the 
feedback effect (i.e., the endogeneity problem) can be tackled by the use of appropriate 
15 
 
instruments or proxies that are less likely to be influenced by economic performance. In time-
series analysis, such instrumentation can be introduced by taking lagged values of the 
institutional quality indicators. 
 
Now we can convert the visual model into a quantifiable statement by using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. We do this in two stages. First, we derive what we call a reduced-form 
regression equation for per-capita output from a Cobb-Douglas function that does not include 
institutions. Then, we write down an expanded regression equation by adding institutional 
quality as a factor that affects output in the Cobb-Douglas function. In both cases, we assume 
that technology is endogenous. The endogenous technology assumption is in line with 
endogenous growth theory of Mankiw et al (1992). It is also in line with Hall and Jones (1999), 
who try to measure the impact of ‘social infrastructure’ (i.e., institutional quality) on cross-
country differences in productivity.   
 
The growth model without institutions is denoted as neo-classical (nc) and stated as follows: 
 
αα −= 1, )()( ttnct ALKY        (1) 
Y is real output, K is capital, L is labour and A is technology, and t is time. α and β are shares of 
capital and labour in income. 
 
Dividing each side by population (N), we derive an expression for per-capita output instead of 
output level. Hence: 
 
βα )]([)(, N
LAN
K
N
Y ttnct =      (2) 
Taking logs to derive a linear relationship, we obtain: 
 
)ln(ln)ln(ln , N
LAN
K
N
Y ttnct ββα ++=   (3) 
 
Equation (3) is a standard neo-classical per-capita growth equation that excludes institutional 
quality. 
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Now, in line with the analysis above, let us assume that institutional quality affects output 
through its market-creating and market-deepening effects. Then the institutions-inclusive Cobb-
Douglas production function can be written as follows: 
 
βα )()( 1,1,, ttqttqit ALIKIY −−=       (4) 
Here, itY , is output at period t with institutions and Iq, t-1 is institutional quality at period t-1. The 
institutional quality variable is lagged one period in order to reduce the risk of reverse causality.  
 
As above, we can divide each side by population (N) in order to obtain an expression for per-
capita output.  
βα )]([)( 1,1,, N
LAIN
KIN
Y t
tq
t
tq
it
−−=     (5) 
 
Taking logs, we obtain the institutions-inclusive expression for per-capita growth in a linear 
form. 
1,
, ln)ln(ln)ln(ln −+++= tqttit IN
LAN
K
N
Y βββα  (6) 
 
Comparing equations (3) and (6), we can see that the difference between the institutions-
exclusive and institutions-inclusive formulations boils down to β lnIq, t-1. 
 
Having derived the type of effects that institutions are likely to have on economic performance 
and the type of institutions that these effects are associated with, we can now examine the recent 
empirical literature to address two issues. First, to what extent are the stipulated effects 
compatible with the emerging empirical findings? Secondly, to what extent are the empirical 
findings robust / reliable? 
 
4. Institutions and economic performance: the evidence 
 
We have identified 21 empirical studies probing at least one of the two institutional effects on 
economic performance. (See, Table A1 in the Appendix). These studies, which were all 
conducted between 1995-2004,  report a statistically significant relationship between 
institutional quality and economic performance. Some of them demonstrate that the direction of 
causation is from institutions to economic performance and not the other way round. Some 
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others report that variations in institutional quality are more significant than other variables that 
also affect economic performance (e.g., geography or openness to trade).  
 
In all of the work reviewed below, the authors use cross-country data and multiple regression 
techniques where institutional quality indicators are among the independent variables. Some of 
the authors use different instrumentation techniques in order to address the endogeneity problem 
– i.e., the possibility that institutional quality and economic performance may be both 
determined by other factors or there is reverse causality from economic performance to 
institutional quality.  Indicators of institutional quality are constructed with data from various 
sources, including: the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by Political Risk 
Services; the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI); World Values Survey; and special 
surveys.4
 
  
We begin with the work of Knack and Keefer published in the mid-1990s. Knack and Keefer 
(1995) combine the ‘institutions as rules of the game’ and ‘institutions as governance quality’ 
perspectives. They examine the impact of two institutional quality indices on economic 
performance. The index corresponding to the ‘institutions as rules of the game’ perspective 
includes indicators such as contract enforceability, risk of nationalisation, rule of law, etc. The 
index corresponding to the ‘institutions as governance quality’ perspective is based on indicators 
such as bureaucratic quality, corruption, bureaucratic delays, etc. The authors report that 
institutions protecting property rights are significant predictors of economic growth.  
 
In a subsequent study, Knack and Keefer (1997a) focus on indicators of ‘institutions as rules of 
the game’ – namely on trust and civic cooperation norms. Their data set covers 29 countries, for 
which data is acquired from the World Values Survey. The authors test for the impact of 
differences in trust and civic cooperation norms on investment/GDP ratios and GDP per capita 
growth rates over the 1980-92 period. They find that both trust and civic cooperation are 
positively associated with per capita GDP growth rates. A ten-percentage-point increase in the 
trust variable is associated with a 0.8 percentage point improvement in the growth of GDP per 
head. Similarly, a four-point rise in the 50-point civic cooperation variable is associated with 
more than 1 percentage point in the growth variable. The authors tries to correct for endogeneity 
by using ethnic cleavage and the number of law students as instrumental variables – i.e., as 
                                                 
4 The ICRG ratings begin in 1982 and are updated monthly. The ICRG composite index consists of 5 variables, 3 of 
which are on a 6-point scale and 2 on a 10-point scale. BERI consists of four variables, all of which are scored on a 
0-4 scale. For information on BERI and ICRG data, see Knack and Keefer (1995) and Clague et al (1997a). 
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institutional proxies that are less likely to be influenced by the level of development itself. They 
find out that trust remains a significant predictor of growth. The authors report similar results for 
the impact of institutions on investment/GDP ratios. Although both trust and civic cooperation 
are both statistically significant, the significance of the trust variable is limited to one-tail tests 
only.  
 
In a parallel study, Knack and Keefer (1997b) examine the impact of institutions on a developing 
country’s ability to catch up with developed countries. This is an innovative exercise as it 
constitutes the first attempt to re-specify the neoclassical convergence model. They find that 
institutional indicators such as rule of law, pervasiveness of corruption, the risk of contract 
repudiation, etc. have significant effect on a country’s ability to catch up. The authors conduct 
robustness tests and report that institutional factors remain significant determinants of 
convergence. 
 
Another set of studies published around 1996 and 1997 focus on ‘institutions as governance 
quality’ and report similar results. For example, Ades and di Tella (1996), reviews the empirical 
literature on the relationship between corruption and investment. They report that the majority of 
the work reviewed leads to two unequivocal conclusions: (i) corruption and judicial system 
quality are associated positively; and (ii) higher levels of corruption are associated with lower 
investment levels. Brunetti et al (1997a and 1997b) focus on institutional factors that affect the 
credibility and predictability of the rules affecting business establishments. In Brunetti et al 
(1997a), the data is on 3,600 companies drawn from a large number of countries. The authors 
conduct cross-country and cross-company regressions and find that the credibility of the rules is 
a significant determinant of investment decisions by the firms and growth rates recorded by the 
countries. In Brunetti at al (1997b), the authors regress foreign direct investment and economic 
growth on indicators of institutional predictability. They report that institutional predictability 
explains a large part of the differences in foreign investment flows attracted and economic 
growth rates recorded. Political stability and security of the property rights are found to be 
especially important.  
 
Clague et al (1997a) use a combination of institutional indicators that cut across the two types of 
institutions – i.e., institutions as rules of the game and institution as governance quality. Their 
institutional quality indicator is a composite index consisting of 5 ICRG variables, 4 BERI 
variables and a contract intensity measure defined as contract-intensive money, measured as the 
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ratio of the non-currency money to the money stock (M2). The authors conduct multivariate tests 
and report that all institutional measures have positive and statistically significant impacts on 
investment and output growth. These results are obtained by controlling other relevant variables 
that may affect investment and output, which include initial income levels, human capital 
accumulation, and the relative price of investment goods. The results remain the same 
irrespective of whether the sample consists of all countries for which data is available or only 
less developed countries. In terms of magnitudes, the authors report that a 5-point increase in the 
50-point ICRG index or a one-point increase in the 16-point BERI index is associated with a one 
percentage point increase in the investment/GDP ratio. An increase of 9 points in the ICRG and 
of 2 points in the BERI index is associated with about one percentage point increase in the 
growth rate of the GDP per head. The authors report that the contract-intensive money is also 
positively associated with investment ratios and per capita GDP growth rates. 
 
Three more studies published in 1999 also report similar results. For example, Hall and Jones 
(1999), addresses the impact of institutions on productivity differentials. Their social 
infrastructure indicator is close to the ‘institutions as governance quality’ definition and consists 
of institutional measures such as law and order, bureaucratic quality, risk of appropriation, 
corruption, etc. They find that social infrastructure account for much of the difference in 
productivity measured as output per worker.5
 
 Similarly, Kaufmann et al (1999) also adopt an 
‘institutions as governance quality’ perspective.  They use six clusters of institutional quality 
indicators and examine their effect on development outcomes that include GDP per head, infant 
mortality and adult literacy. The authors report a strong relationship between governance quality 
and development outcomes. Their results hold irrespective whether OECD countries are 
included in or excluded from the sample.  
Finally, Rodrik (1999) assesses the impact of institutional quality on the sustainability of 
economic growth. He reports that internal social conflicts and weak conflict resolution 
institutions explain why high growth rates experienced in some periods did not persist and why a 
large number of countries experienced growth collapse after mid-1970s. This finding suggests 
that institutional quality is a predictor of not only economic growth but also of its sustainability. 
 
                                                 
5 Grigorian et al (2000) lend support to Hall and Jones’ finding. On the basis of data for 27 Asian and Latin 
American countries, they report that the development of the legal and regulatory framework leads to higher 
industrial output growth rates, mainly through its impact on total factor productivity.  
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Rodrik (2000) addresses a different issue that arises both in the political economy of policy 
design and in the institutional approach to economic performance. This is the issue of whether 
democracy as a meta-institution is conducive to better economic performance.  His findings 
suggest that some economic performance indicators are positively related to democracy. First of 
all, participatory democracies are associated with growth characterised by greater predictability, 
stability, superior distributional outcomes, and better resilience to shocks. Secondly, higher 
operational and institutional autonomy of the executive and lower levels of participation are not 
associated with resilience to shocks. In other words, policy autonomy combined with lower 
levels of participation leads to significant declines in growth rates after the economy is hit by an 
adverse shock. Thirdly, countries with greater political freedoms experienced smaller declines in 
economic growth when there was a break in their economic growth trend in mid-1970s.6
 
 
Democracy may be associated with less volatile economic growth and better distributional 
outcomes for two of reasons. First, Democracy is conducive to relatively higher levels of 
transparency and accountability. To the extent that this is the case, the risk of excessive 
discretion to be exercised by policy-makers or the incidence of rent-seeking by organised 
interest groups is lower. Secondly, democracy allows economic actors to choose the optimal 
combinations of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ strategies that would force the policy-makers to improve the 
quality of the public policy. In other words, under democracy, policy failures can be punished 
either by exiting the jurisdiction (voting with one’s feet) or by shifting support to other parties 
(sacking the incumbents). Still another punishment mechanism is to raise one’s ‘voice’, which 
can take the form protest or complaints.7 The combination of these exit-voice strategies may 
make democracies conducive to lower income inequality and less economic instability.8
 
 
The empirical findings summarised above lend significant support to the argument that 
institutional quality is a significant predictor of cross-country variations in economic 
                                                 
6 See also Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), who cast serious doubt on the ‘insulation’ of policy-makers as a necessary 
condition for better economic performance.  
 
7 On the dynamics of Exit, Voice and Loyalty as societal reactions to deterioration in public policy, product quality, 
or company performance, see Hirschman (1970).  
 
8 Other studies also reported a degree of association between democracy as a meta-institution and economic 
performance. For example, Barro (1996) report a non-linear relationship between democracy and growth. Barro 
indicates that there is a positive correlation between democracy and growth at low levels of democracy, but a 
negative correlation at high levels. This finding lends support to Olson (1982), who argues that mature democracies 
suffer from the proliferation of self-serving interests groups. Chowdhurie-Aziz (1997) reports a positive linear 
association between the degree of non-elite participation in politics and economic growth. Finally, Tavares and 
Wacziarg (1996) point out an indirect effect of democracy on growth – namely that institutional quality may 
encourage growth through its positive effects on education, reduced inequality and lower government consumption. 
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performance. In addition, the positive association between institutional quality and economic 
performance holds for different indicators of institutional quality and economic performance. 
Finally, institutional quality is good not only for economic performance over a period, but also 
for the sustainability of economic growth.  
 
These results, however, should not detract attention from two empirical/methodological 
problems that call for caution. 
 
First, both institutional quality and economic performance may be determined endogenously. In 
other words, institutional quality (i.e., the explanatory variable) may be affected by the level of 
development itself (i.e., by the dependent variable); or both variables may be affected by other 
variables that are excluded from the regression equations. The endogeneity problem is also 
posed by the subjective nature of the institutional indicators. The latter are collected through 
surveys of experts or other actors, whose perceptions of institutions at a particular time are likely 
to be influenced by how well the economy is performing at the time of the survey. Unless further 
robustness tests and instrumentation (i.e., proxying) techniques are used, this endogeneity 
problem reduces the reliability of the regression results.  
 
Acemoglu et al (2001) come up with an interesting solution to the endogeneity problem. To 
ensure that the effect captured by the regression is not exaggerated by reverse causality – i.e., by 
the effect of economic development on institutional quality - they use data on settler mortality 
rates. Settler mortality rates enable the authors to identify regions/lands where colonial settlers 
were less likely to settle for long because of high health hazards. Settlers in high-health-risk 
areas would be inclined to secure extraction in the short run and would be less concerned about 
building institutions guaranteeing property rights in the long run. Settlers in low-health-risk 
areas, however, can be expected to have an interest in building institutions guaranteeing property 
rights. Because variations in settler mortality rates and the following variations in institution-
building efforts preceded divergence in economic performance, a negative relationship between 
settler death rates and economic performance would suggest that: (i) institutional quality is a 
good predictor of economic performance; and (ii) the causality would be from institutions to 
economic performance rather than the other way round. Acemoglu et al (2001) report that settler 
death rates (hence, institutional quality) are good predictors of the current discrepancy in 
economic performance. 
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However, Rodrik (2004) criticises Acemoglu et al (2001) for the prominence they accord to 
geography. He draws attention to the fact that income discrepancy between countries that had 
never been colonised is as large as the discrepancy within the sample of colonised countries. 
Therefore, an appropriate econometric instrument (settler mortality rates) is not the same as 
providing an adequate answer to the question about the effect of institutions on economic 
development.  
 
The second problem we need to consider relates to the effect of other variables – e.g., openness 
to trade and geography – on economic performance. For example, Frankel and Romer (1999) use 
the nominal trade/GDP ratio as a measure of openness and report that the degree of openness is a 
significant predictor of the cross-country variations in economic performance. Later on, Alcala 
and Ciccone (2004) use the ratio of nominal trade to purchasing-power-parity-adjusted GDP (the 
so-called ‘real openness’ indicator) and report a similar result. In fact, Alcala and Ciccone 
demonstrate that their results obtained by using the real openness indicator are more robust than 
those reported by Frankel and Romer.  
 
Similar results are reported with respect to the effect of geography too. For example, Gallup et al 
(1998) examine the relationship between geography and economic growth, controlling for 
economic policies and institutions. They find that geographical location and climate have large 
effects on income levels and growth rates. Geographical factors impact upon economic 
performance via transportation costs, disease burden and low productivity in agriculture. Sachs 
(2001) also reports that geographical location is a significant determinant of low technology in 
two sectors: agriculture and healthcare. As a result, countries located in tropical areas tend to 
record lower growth rates. Finally, Sachs (2003) controls for institutional quality and 
demonstrates that malaria transmission has a direct and significant effect on per capita income 
levels.  
 
Given these findings on the impact of non-institutional factors such as openness to trade and 
geography, we need to disentangle the partial effects of both institutional and non-institutional 
variables, and establish whether collinearity exists between them. To address these issues, Dollar 
and Kraay (2003) examine the partial effects of openness to trade and institutional quality on per 
capita GDP. They report that cross-country regressions of per capita GDP trend on proxied 
measures of openness and institutional quality do not provide reliable information about the 
partial effect of either institutions or trade in the long run. This is mainly because of the high 
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level of correlation between openness and institutional quality. To avoid this problem, Dollar 
and Kraay regress decade-long changes in growth rates on decade-long changes in the degree of 
openness to trade and institutional quality. They find that trade has a significant effect on GDP 
growth, but institutions do not. 
 
Rodrik et al (2004) respond to Dollar and Kraay (2003) by conducting a two-stage regression to 
estimate the direct and indirect effects of institutions, trade and geography on economic 
performance. They report that the ‘quality of institutions’ is more significant than either 
geography or trade. In fact, they demonstrate that when institutions are controlled for, 
conventional measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes whereas trade 
is insignificant and enters into the equation with the wrong (i.e., negative) sign. The estimated 
direct effect of institutions on incomes is positive and large. A unit improvement in institutional 
quality increases log income by 2.15. The estimated direct effect of trade on income is negative 
but statistically insignificant. Finally, the estimated effect of trade on institutions is positive but 
small. As a result, Rodrik et al (2004) argue that ‘institutions rule’ as far as partial direct effects 
are concerned. 
 
This finding suggests that it is difficult to accept Dollar and Kraay’s argument that 
‘multicollinearity blurs the individual effects of institutions and trade’. Although geography and 
trade may affect institutional quality, it is possible to control for such effects and identify the 
institutions’ partial effects independently. In addition, Rodrik et al (2004) demonstrates that 
Dollar and Kraay’s scepticism about the tractability of the partial effects are due to arbitrariness 
in their sampling (for example, omission of some European countries that are not essentially 
outliers) and their choice of independent variables (for example, the substitution of nominal 
openness with ‘real’ openness). That is why it is not surprising to observe that the significance of 
the partial effects of institutions is confirmed by other studies too. For example, Nsouli et al 
(2004) examine the partial effects of institutions and IMF programme implementation on the 
basis of data for 197 IMF programmes approved between 1992-2002. They report the following 
findings: (i) improvement in institutional quality during the programme implementation period 
are associated with better growth performance; (ii) although institutional quality and programme 
implementation are both important determinants of growth, institutional factors have a 
quantitatively larger effect; and (iii) although programme implementation is the major influence 
on current account balance in the first year of the implementation period, institutional factors 
have a larger effect in the long run.  
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Conclusions 
 
In the light of the review above, we can argue that the theoretical/analytical propositions about 
the positive impact of institutions on economic performance are compatible with the evidence on 
the ground. This argument remains valid with different data sets and different estimation 
techniques.  
 
One contribution of the institutional approach has been the incorporation of institutional quality 
into formal models of growth and investment. This contribution has strengthened the view in 
economics research that markets neither function in a vacuum nor tend to settle on an optimal 
equilibrium. Markets function effectively and optimally only if effective institutions exist and if 
these institutions set the ‘rules of the game’ such that collective action problems are resolved and 
the scope for rent-seeking are minimised. In the absence of such institutions, an economy may 
settle on a sub-optimal equilibrium for long time periods. But this is not all: the institutional 
approach also implies that economic growth is more of a dis-equilibrium process rather than 
smooth and continuous adjustments at the margins. 
 
The other contribution of the institutional approach is empirical. We now have a large volume of 
empirical work that demonstrates that institutional quality indicators such as rule of law, 
regulatory quality, democracy, control of corruption, etc. have significant and robust effects on 
economic growth, technological innovation, per-capita income growth, variations in per-capita 
income across countries. Because of the subjective nature of the institutional quality indicators, 
which are derived from public opinion or expert surveys, the institutional approach has also 
pushed the economic research towards methodological innovation. Such innovations included 
use of instrumental variables as well as panel-data causality tests. Furthermore, the interest of the 
institutional approach in institutional quality data has spurred international organisations and 
think tanks to invest in the collection and refinement of institutional data.  
 
The third contribution of the institutional approach has been in the area of policy. The quality of 
governance and governance institutions has become a central theme in the relationship between 
developing countries on the one hand and the international organisations such as the IMF and the 
World Bank and donor country governments on the other. Indeed, the number of working and 
policy papers with an institutional focus has increased significantly within the research output 
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from the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
more recently, from other regional development banks. Although this can be taken as indicator 
of policy relevance of the institutional approach, the focus on governance and institutions in 
developing countries only may foster false confidence in the institutional quality of the 
developed world – a confidence that has been questioned to some extent by the recent financial 
crisis.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Empirical studies on institutions and economic performance 
 
Author(s) 
 
Methodology 
 
Relevant findings 
 
1. Acemoglu et al 
(2001) 
 
Cross-country regressions, using 
settler mortality rate as an 
instrument for institutional quality. 
They examine whether this measure 
of institutional quality explains 
cross-country variations in income 
levels.  
 
The authors report that differences in settler 
death rates are good predictors of variations 
in institutional quality and that the latter 
explain the difference in economic 
performance.  
 
2. Ades, A. and 
R. di Tella (1996) 
 
Reviews the empirical literature on 
causes and effects of corruption on 
investment. 
 
Corruption is associated with less 
independent judicial system and the lack of 
competition in the product markets. Higher 
corruption is associated with lower 
investment. 
 
3. Ades, A. and 
R. di Tella (1999) 
 
Constructs a model of corruption on 
the basis of compensation theory. 
Presents a general structure of 
corruption regressions and 
examines the causes of corruption. 
 
Countries where firms enjoy higher rents 
(i.e., countries where competition rules are 
weak or absent) tend to have higher levels 
of corruption.  
 
4. Brunetti, A., et 
al (1997a) 
 
 
World-wide survey of 3,600 
business establishments. Constructs 
an index of ‘credibility of rules’. 
Cross-firm and cross-country 
regressions to test the relationship 
between the credibility index and 
economic performance. 
 
Credibility promotes investment and 
economic growth. The most important 
components of the credibility index are: (i) 
predictability of laws and policies; (ii) 
reliability of judiciary; and (iii) lack of 
corruption.  
 
5. Brunetti, A., et 
al (1997b) 
 
 
 
Presents indicators of the 
predictability of the institutional 
framework in 20 transition 
economies. Regression of economic 
growth on these indicators. 
 
Reports that the predictability of the 
institutional framework explains a large part 
of the differences in foreign investment and 
economic growth. Political stability and 
security of property rights are very 
important.  
 
6. Campos, N. F. 
(2000) 
 
Presents five indicators of 
institutional quality: (i) 
accountability of the executive; (ii) 
quality of the bureaucracy; (iii) rule 
of law; (iii) nature or policy 
making; (iv) process; and (v) 
strength of civil society. Examines 
their effects on per capita income 
and life expectancy. 
 
 
Rule of law is the most important 
institutional quality affecting per capita 
income. In terms of life expectancy, 
bureaucratic quality is the most important 
factor. 
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Author(s) 
 
Methodology 
 
Relevant findings 
 
7. Clague, C. et al 
(1997a) 
 
The authors examines the relationship 
between institutional indicators 
(expropriation risk, rule of law, 
repudiation of contracts, quality of 
bureaucracy, bureaucratic dealy, etc.) 
and per capita income growth rates 
and investment/GDP ratios. 
 
 
They report significant relationship 
between institutional indicators and 
economic performance. Although some 
non-institutional factors are also related to 
economic performance, the impact of 
institutional variables is much higher. 
 
8. Clague, C. et al 
(1997b) 
 
The authors examine the impact of 
regime type and regime duration on 
institutional quality. Regime types 
vary between dictatorship and 
democracy (represented by a scale of 
1-5). 
 
The authors find that long-lasting 
democracies provide better property rights 
(institutional quality) than long-term 
dictatorships. Fixed-effects regressions, 
however, do not point out to improved 
property rights when dictatorships are 
replaced by democracies. In other words, 
the duration of the democracy is more 
important than its adoption. 
9. Clarke, G. R. 
G. (2001) 
 
The paper assesses the effect of 
institutional quality on R&D 
expenditures in developing countries. 
The variables used to measure 
institutional quality are risk of 
appropriation and rule of law. 
 
The author reports that the measures of 
institutional quality are correlated with 
R&D expenditures. Several robustness 
checks enable the authors to uphold the 
hypothesis that R&D expenditures 
increase in institutional quality. 
 
10. Grigorian, D. 
et al (2000) 
 
Tests the link between industrial 
growth and indicators of institutional 
quality. 
 
The authors find significant evidence 
that institutional quality affects 
industrial growth in 27 developing 
countries. Their results suggest that 
the development of the legal and 
regulatory framework works its way to 
industrial growth through investment 
and total factor productivity. 
 
11. Hall, R. and 
C. Jones (1999) 
 
Cross-country regressions involving 
capital accumulation and productivity 
as dependent variables, and ‘social 
infrastructure’ as independent 
variable. The social infrastructure 
consists of law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, risk of 
appropriation, corruption, etc. 
 
 
Differences in social infrastructure 
account for much of the difference in 
long-run economic performance, 
measured by output per worker, capital 
intensity and human capital per worker.  
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Author(s) 
 
Methodology 
 
Relevant findings 
 
12. Henisz, W. 
(2000) 
 
Uses a measure of political constraint. 
The measure incorporates the number 
of independent branches of 
government with veto power and 
distribution of preferences across and 
within branches. 
 
The paper reports an explicit relationship 
between the measure of political 
constraints and variations in cross-
national growth rates. 
 
 
13. Isham, J. et al 
(1997) 
 
 
Examines the impact of government 
efficacy and governance quality on 
the performance of government 
investment projects financed by the 
World Bank. 
 
 
Civil liberties have a strong effect on 
performance even when the level of 
democracy is controlled. Countries with 
the highest indicators of civil liberties 
have investment projects with an 
economic rate of return that is 8-22 per 
cent higher than countries with lowest 
indicators. 
 
14. Kaufmann, D. 
et al (1999) 
 
Uses six clusters of institutional 
quality indicators drawn from 
commercial and non-commercial 
sources. Examines the impact of 
differences in governance quality on 
development outcomes that include 
GDP per head, infant mortality and 
adult literacy. 
 
The authors report a strong relationship 
between governance quality and 
development outcomes. They find that 
these results hold irrespective of whether 
or not OECD countries are included in the 
analysis. 
 
15. Knack, S. and 
P. Keefer (1995) 
 
Cross-country regressions, using two 
composite indices of institutional 
development. One index includes 
indicators such as quality of 
bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, 
etc. The other includes bureaucratic 
delay, contract enforceability, risk of 
nationalization, etc. 
 
The study finds that institutions protecting 
property rights significant predictors of 
economic growth. Therefore, 
improvement in institutional quality 
increases the rate of convergence between 
developing and developed countries. 
 
16. Knack, S. and 
P. Keefer (1997a) 
 
Cross-country regressions using trust 
and civic cooperation norms as 
indicators of informal institution 
quality. The study covers 29 market 
economies and uses data from World 
Values Survey. It examines the extent 
to which institutional differences 
affect a country’s macroeconomic 
performance. 
 
Trust and civic cooperation have 
significant impact on economic 
performance. Both trust and civic 
cooperation have statistically significant 
effects on GDP per capita growth rates. 
The effect of civic cooperation on 
investment/GDP ratios is more significant 
than the effect of trust, which is 
significant at 5% only in one-tail test. 
 
17. Knack, S. and 
P. Keefer (1997b) 
 
Cross-section data used to regress 
convergence on institutional quality 
measures such as rule of law, 
pervasiveness of corruption, contract 
repudiation, etc. 
 
The authors report that weak institutional 
indicators are significant obstacle to a 
country’s ability to catch up. 
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Author(s) 
 
Methodology 
 
Relevant findings 
 
18. Nsouli, S. M. 
et al (2004) 
 
The authors examine the relationship 
between a country’s institutional and 
political environment, its 
implementation of the IMF 
programmes, and macroeconomic 
performance. The sample consists of 
197 IMF programmes approved from 
1992-2002. 
 
They report that a stronger institutional 
and political environment is associated 
with better macroeconomic outcomes and 
better implementation of the IMF 
programmes. 
 
19. Rigobon, R. 
and D. Rodrik 
(2004) 
 
The authors estimate the inter-
relationships among economic 
institutions, political institutions, 
openness and income levels, using 
full data set for 86 countries (53 
colonised and 33 non colonised).  
 
The ordinary least squares estimate show 
that economic and political institutions 
have the strongest effect on output 
growth. Openness to trade has very little 
effect and the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Several robustness 
tests suggest that the OLS estimates are 
robust to variable specification and 
country inclusion/exclusion. 
 
20. Rodrik, D. 
(1999) 
 
Develops and test a model on the 
interactions among shocks, internal 
conflict and conflict management 
institutions. 
 
Internal social conflict and weak conflict 
management institutions explain why high 
growth rates do not persist in some 
countries and why a large number of 
countries have experienced growth 
collapse since mid-1970s. 
 
21. Rodrik, D. 
(2000) 
 
Partial regressions of economic 
performance indicators on democracy 
as a meta institution.  
 
The author reports that democracies yield 
long-run growth rates that are more 
predictable, produce greater short-term 
stability, deals with adverse shocks better 
and deliver better distributional outcomes. 
 
22. Rodrik, D. et 
al (2004) 
 
The authors estimate the respective 
effects of institutions, geography and 
trade on income levels in two country 
samples. Sample 1 consists of 80 
countries for which instrumental data 
(settler mortality statistics) exist. 
Sample 2 consists of 140 countries for 
which data for alternative instruments 
for institutions exist. 
 
They report that institutional quality is a 
significant determinant of cross-country 
income variation. Once the institutional 
variable is added, geography and trade do 
not have any additional explanatory 
power in explaining development. Not 
only are institutions significant, their 
impact is large and the estimated 
coefficients of trade and geography have 
the ‘wrong’ sign.  
 
 
 
 
